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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of European Central Bank communication on the price 
discovery process in the Euribor futures market using a new tick-by-tick dataset. First, we 
show that two pieces of news systematically hit financial markets on Governing Council 
meeting days: the ECB policy rate decision and the explanation of its monetary policy stance. 
Second, we find that the unexpected component of ECB explanations has a significant and 
sizeable impact on futures prices. This indicates that the ECB has already acquired some 
credibility: financial markets seem to believe that it does what it says it will do. Finally, our 
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“Financial markets evidence indeed indicates that we as a central bank have 
managed to be understood by market professionals. (…) 
One of the main goal of a responsible central bank now is to have a reliable 
communication guiding expectations in a rapidly changing environment.” 
Trichet (2005) 
 
“A month ago Jean-Claude Trichet gave what markets see as his standard nod 
and wink: the European Central Bank (ECB), said its president, would 
continue to exercise "vigilance" against inflationary pressures. Stand by, in 
other words, for another increase in interest rates at the bank's next rate-
setting meeting on October 5. ECB-watchers were therefore well prepared 
when rates duly rose, by a quarter of a percentage point, to 3.25%.” 
The Economist (2006) 
 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
 Do European Central Bank (henceforth ECB) announcements affect market expectations 
about the future path of its monetary policy? How long does it take for these messages to be 
promptly incorporated into asset prices? Is it possible to assess the effect of central bank 
communication without relying on the exogeneity assumption of monetary policy shocks? Is the 
Euribor futures market informational efficient? To address these questions, this paper uses a 
novel data set to present extensive evidence on market efficiency1 in relation to central bank 
announcements. 
 The value added of this study to the empirical finance literature on the efficient market 
hypothesis is two-fold. First, we test market efficiency for a new type of news item, specifically 
for the information originating from central bank announcements, in real time, i.e. using a high-
frequency tick-by-tick dataset. Second, we analyze the efficiency of a new financial market, the 
Euribor futures market. By doing so, we address two shortcomings of the existing literature. On 
the one side, we analyze a money market while most empirical studies focus on the foreign 
exchange and stock market. On the other side, we investigate the efficiency property of a 
European financial market, while most finance literature studies US markets. 
Our work also contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on central bank 
communication. Since central banking is increasingly becoming the art of managing expectations, 
communication has developed into a key monetary policy instrument. In this paper we examine 
the real-time effects of central bank announcements on financial markets. We show that market 
participants respond to two different pieces of news rather than just one piece of news, as is 
commonly analyzed in the monetary economics literature. Therefore, in order to properly 
describe the central bank conduct of monetary policy we find that two dimensions are needed: 
                                                 
1 In an efficient capital market, security prices fully reflect all available information. 
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both central bank actions and central bank words. Put it differently, our results suggest that 
Kuttner (2001) type analysis, based only on monetary policy shocks (i.e., a single factor), is not 
completely adequate. Nowadays, central banks are also able to affect asset prices through their 
bias statements, a second policy instrument. 
We apply our empirical methodology to investigate the effectiveness of the ECB 
communication policy because of its unique institutional characteristic of first announcing its 
policy rate decisions (i.e. the minimum bid rate for the main refinancing operations of the 
Eurosystem) and then, after about 45 minutes, explaining its monetary policy stance.2 By using a 
new intraday dataset, we are able to neatly investigate the effects on asset prices of the latter 
announcement separately from the policy decision. We can thus circumvent the endogeneity and 
omitted variables problems (i.e., interest rate changes and monetary policy shocks can be 
influenced by each other and by other common variables) that affect most of the previous work. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, by using number of transactions 
and volumes data, we show qualitatively that financial markets immediately react to the two 
pieces of news that systematically reach them on Governing Council meeting days, that is the 
policy decision announcement communicated at 12:45 3 and the ECB President monthly press 
conference starting at 13:30. 
Second, by using a new tick-by-tick dataset, we show quantitatively that innovations in 
market expectations about future monetary policy can be explained by unexpected ECB 
announcements, i.e. the difference between what the ECB announces and what the market 
expects the ECB to announce. In particular, we find that the news shock is not only statistically 
and economically significant, but also quantitatively important. On the one hand, this evidence 
suggests that even if the ECB is a relatively young central bank, it has already acquired some 
credibility.4 In other words, financial markets believe that the European Central Bank does what 
it says it will do. On the other hand, the econometric results presented in this paper indicate that 
ECB words and deeds have been consistent with each other, otherwise market participants would 
not have reacted to central bank announcements. 
Third, futures prices incorporate the news stemming from the ECB President speech very 
quickly, in around one hour. Moreover, the Euribor futures market satisfies the semi-strong form 
                                                 
2 In particular, during the monthly press conference the ECB President explains the Bank’s assessment of 
the economic situation, the risks to medium term price stability and the way in which they systematically 
affect policy decisions. 
3 Throughout the paper, London time is always used. We do not employ Greenwich Mean Time because it 
needs to be adjusted for Daylight Saving. 
4 We have in mind Blinder (1998, page 64) definition of credibility: “Matching deeds to words. (…) 
Credibility means that your pronouncements are believed – even though you are bound by no rule and 
may even have a short-run incentive to renege. In the real world, such credibility is not normally created 
by incentive compatible compensation schemes nor by rigid precommitment. Rather, it is painstakingly 
built up by a history of matching deeds to words. A central bank that consistently does what it says will 
acquire credibility by this definition almost regardless of the institutional structure.” 
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definition of informational efficiency, i.e. public information cannot be used to make abnormal 
profits relative to the risks being borne. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
measurement of the tone of ECB announcements. In Section 3, we describe the rolling 3-month 
Euribor futures data. And, in order to illustrate the advantages of using high-frequency data, we 
analyse the futures price dynamics in specific announcement days. Finally, we provide some 
qualitative analysis based on number of transactions and volumes of contracts exchanged during 
a trading day. In Section 4, we estimate the effect of the news shock using intraday tick-by-tick 
data from the Euribor futures market. In Section 5, we perform some important robustness checks 
and sensitivity analysis. In Section 6, we discuss the implications of our findings for testing the 
market efficiency hypothesis in real time, and for central bank communication and monetary 
policy. In Section 7, we suggest some important issues left for future research and conclude. 
 
2  Measuring the tone of ECB announcements 
 
Since its inception, the ECB has paid a great deal of attention to its announcement policy, 
and especially to its choice of medium, form and content. In order to properly communicate with 
the public, and address the informational needs of the various target groups, politicians, 
academics, the press, financial markets, etc., it uses many different instruments. These include the 
Monthly Bulletin, the President’s monthly press conference (and its Questions and Answers 
session), the Testimony to the Committee on Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (four 
times a year)5 and frequent speeches by its President and / or members of the Governing Council. 
In its Monthly Bulletin of November 2002 (page 64), the ECB said that “The monthly 
press conferences held by the President and the Vice-President and the Monthly Bulletin are two 
of the most important communication channels adopted by the ECB.” In particular, the press 
conference is a timely instrument to communicate concisely to the public the ECB Governing 
Council's view of recent economic developments. Indeed, in its Monthly Bulletin of January 
2006 (page 57), the ECB confirmed that the President press conference “provides a detailed 
explanation of the economic outlook for the euro area and the risks to price stability. This 
communication is aimed at improving the public’s understanding of the current decision and the 
possible future course of policy interest rates.” 
  For simplicity and consistency, in this paper we restrict our econometric analysis only to 
the wording of the press conferences. We consider this research work as a in a broader research 
agenda that aims to investigate the real-time effectiveness of all ECB communication channels. It 
                                                 
5 Before March 2001, this was called either Hearing before the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs of the European Parliament or Speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Note that before 2002 it took place twice a year. 
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seems to us that the introductory statement to the monthly press conference represents a natural 
candidate for the first step, as it is simple, relatively short compared to the Monthly Bulletin and 
systematic in terms of its frequency and structure. 
In order to make the European monetary authority’s statements suitable for statistical 
computation, we assign a number to each ECB monthly announcement. This number is intended 
to summarize the ECB overall monetary policy stance as communicated by its Governing 
Council.6 
Since words are not precise quantitative data, the ranking of statements according to their 
assessment (tightening, neutral or easing) of ECB future policy rate setting behaviour is 
necessarily influenced by personal judgement. Although we acknowledge that our assessment is 
subjective, it should be noted that the overall tone of ECB announcements is usually 
unambiguous.7 
The classification of statements is often referred to as content analysis (Krippendorf, 
2004 and Weber, 2004): it consists of a set of techniques to systematically extract the content of a 
message. 
In order to analyse the contents of the introductory statement of the ECB President 
monthly press conference held on Governing Council meeting days, we follow Rosa and Verga 
(2006) methodology based on a glossary that translates the qualitative information of the press 
conferences into an ordered scale.8,9 
When more than one word or string from Table 1 (our mapping between words and 
numbers) features in a given press conference, our coding corresponds to the mean of the indices 
of each single expression used by the ECB rounded to its nearest integer. Note that the coding 
attributed to the relative statement (bottom panel of Table 1) constitutes one of the components of 
the calculated mean of indices. 
The wording indicator, Index, is converted into a variable on a five-value scale from -2 to 
+2. The value of zero suggests that the current level of the Repo rate is appropriate to maintain 
price stability over the medium term. The value -1 characterizes an easing period: it is possible 
that the Repo rate will be cut in the near future. The value -2 indicates that the Governing Council 
is increasingly inclined to cut interest rates. The values +1 (+2) characterizes a (strong) likelihood 
of future monetary policy tightening. 
                                                 
6 The seminal paper of Romer and Romer (1989) pioneered this so called narrative approach. In 
particular, they examined the records of Federal Reserve policy deliberations in order to identify 
exogenous (according to their claim) monetary policy shocks. 
7 We do however exclude one press conference (June 2000) because it does not describe the ECB overall 
monetary policy stance, but rather it focuses on the recent (past) economic developments. 
8 For further details about the construction of the glossary, caveats, advantages and disadvantages of this 
methodology, see Rosa and Verga (2006) and Rosa (2006). 
9 Even if we use other people’s wording indicators of the ECB monetary policy stance, such as Gies 
(2005), all the econometric results that we present throughout the paper are qualitatively very similar, and 
remain highly statistically significant. 
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Our assigned value of risk, Index, to each ECB monetary policy announcement is 
reported in Table A1 of the Appendix, where we also provide a few examples of introductory 
statements along with our coding.  
 
3  Euribor futures market data 
 
3.1  Description 
 
On 1 January 1999, the Euro became Europe’s main currency. Since then, new financial 
markets have been set up, including Euribor, 10 the Eonia (Euro OverNight Index Average) and 
Euro denominated short-term interest rate derivatives market. This last gives hedgers and 
speculators easy access to exposure to the Euribor benchmark through trading futures contracts, 
options on the futures contract, and a one-year mid-curve option on the futures contract. 
The three-month Euribor futures contract are cash-settled short-term interest rate 
financial instruments with the Euribor rate for a three-month Euro deposit of a face value of € 
1,000,000 as the underlying asset. 
The Euribor futures contract that we consider in this study is traded at the Euronext Liffe 
(London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange) from 7 to 18.11 Futures prices are 
quoted on a daily basis and the contracted interest rate equals 100 less the futures price. Each 
contract moves in fixed increments (or discrete units / ticks) of 0.005, which corresponds to a 
value of 12.5 €. 
The last trading day of each futures contract is two trading days prior to the third 
Wednesday of the delivery month, while the delivery date is the first business day after the last 
trading day. At a given point in time twenty-five contracts are usually being actively traded. The 
standard delivery months are March, June, September and December, known as quarterly 
expiries. There are also serial expiry contracts that expire in the nearest following six calendar 
months and that do not correspond to the quarterly sequence. Typically serial expiry contracts 
exhibit lower liquidity.12 
                                                 
10 The Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at which 
banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the euro wholesale (or "interbank") money market. 
Euribor is determined (fixed) by the European Banking Federation (EBF) at about 10:00 each day, and is a 
filtered average of inter-bank deposit rates offered by a large panel of designated contributor banks 
(currently more than 50), for maturities ranging from one week to one year. Euribor rates can be 
downloaded at www.euribor.org (last accessed on 31 August 2006). 
11 Euribor futures contracts are also traded at the Eurex (see www.eurexchange.com, last accessed on 1 
October 2006). However, this market displays less liquidity than the LIFFE (anecdotal evidence provided 
by practitioners and traders). 
12 For instance, on 6 October 2006 twenty-five different 3-month futures contracts were displayed on a 
Reuters screen with the following contract expiration date: 16-Oct-06, 13-Nov-06, 18-Dec-06, 15-Jan-07, 
19-Feb-07, 19-Mar-07, 18-Jun-07, 17-Sep-07, 17-Dec-07, 17-Mar-08, 16-Jun-08, 15-Sep-08, 15-Dec-08, 
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It is possible to build two different types of futures price time series: by position and by 
contract. On the one hand, position time series are constructed by merging price data of different 
futures contracts. At a given point in time, the first position is defined as the contract which 
expires next in the quarterly sequence. The second position is represented by the second contract 
to expire in the same quarterly sequence. The third, fourth, etc. positions are constructed 
similarly. On the other hand, as the name suggests, the contract time series starts on the opening 
date of the contract and stops when the futures contract expires. 
In this paper we restrict our attention to the first position 3-month Euribor futures 
contracts (basically 3-month rolling futures contracts) for two reasons. First, we do not need to 
adjust futures prices for a different number of months left to expiration and thus we avoid 
unnecessary complications. For example, Piccinato et al. (1999) find that the intraday statistical 
properties of futures prices are a function of the time left before expiry (i.e. seasonality that 
depends on the “time-to-maturity” effect). Second, studying futures by position can be justified 
on the basis of how the futures market works. In fact, in order to stay in the market, traders 
holding close-to-expiry contracts need to roll their position forward into the next expiry futures 
contract. By doing so, they are constructing a time series by position that extends beyond the 
expiry of each contract. 
Nowadays, the first position contract displays very high liquidity. For instance, during the 
last quarter of 2005, the average daily volume (i.e. number of exchanged contracts) was 
approximately 125,400 futures contracts, with an increase of 50% compared to the same period in 
2004 (83,842 futures contracts) and 68% compared to two years earlier (74,317 in the fourth 
quarter of 2003).13 
 The data used in this study is provided by The Institute for Financial Markets. The 
dataset contains several pieces of information such as transaction by transaction price,14 time of 
trade execution to the nearest second (both January 1999 - June 2006), and volumes (July 2003 - 
June 2006). We have trade data (transaction prices) in our database. However, we do not have 
bid-ask quotes. 
Figure 1 shows that the rolling 3-month futures rate is very similar to, almost 
undistinguishable from, the 3-month-forward 3-month-ahead (implicit) Euribor rate, where this 
rate is derived from the Euribor term structure. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
16-Mar-09, 15-Jun-09, 14-Sep-09, 14-Dec-09, 15-Mar-10, 14-Jun-10, 13-Sep-10, 13-Dec-10, 14-Mar-11, 
13-Jun-11, 19-Sep-11, 19-Dec-11. 
13 Also Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) recognize the importance and very high liquidity of the Euribor 
futures money market. 
14 Around 2,500,000 observations (transaction ticks) for the period January 1999 to June 2006. 
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3.2  Specific announcement days 
 
  The ECB conduct of monetary policy is characterized by the unique institutional feature 
that on the same day and at two different points in time, the ECB Governing Council announces 
its monetary policy decision and explains its monetary policy stance. At 12:45, the ECB 
communicates the new level of its policy rate through a press release. After 45 minutes, at 13:30, 
the monthly press conference starts15 and the ECB President explains to the public the monetary 
policy decision taken and also the Governing Council’s view of recent economic developments. 
The speech is very important, especially for traders, because it conveys strong hints about the 
future path of ECB monetary policy. 
  The advantages of using high-frequency data are best illustrated in Figure 2, which 
reports the tick-by-tick three-month Euribor futures price movements on a set of specific days: 
1)   On 6 April 2006 (Governing Council meeting day), financial market participants fully 
anticipated no change in the policy rate. In particular, there is no sharp market reaction at around 
12:45 GMT. Nevertheless, the futures price jumped up at around 14:00 (this means of course that 
the interest rate fell sharply). Everything happened in twenty minutes: it went from a rate of 
3.085 at 13:33 to 2.98 at 13:56. One explanation could be a dovish speech given by ECB 
President Trichet; recall that the press conference starts at 13:30. One of his answers to 
journalists questions (reported below) was extremely clear about ECB future monetary policy 
moves, and it may shed light on the immediate response of the 3-month futures price movements. 
In his monthly introductory statement, the President did not mention explicitly the key word 
“vigilant” which seems to indicate a strong risk for policy rate spikes in the near future (cf. 
glossary in Table 1). 
Question: Mr Trichet, the markets were expecting you to say 
vigilance in order to prepare them or prepare for an interest rate rise 
in May. You did not say vigilance, was that deliberate? And second, 
did the Council discuss raising rates today?  
Trichet: As we do in all our meetings which concentrate on 
monetary policy, we discussed the issue of rates. We discussed it at 
length. It is our responsibility to be as clear and transparent as 
possible with market participants, investors and savers. I would say 
that the current suggestions regarding the high probability of an 
increase of rates in our next meeting do not correspond to the present 
sentiment of the Governing Council. I would also add that the 
sentiment that I see from time to time in some remarks or market 
literature concerning the perception that we do not increase rates 
when we are out of Frankfurt is equally not at all the sentiment of the 
Governing Council. I trust that, for the sake of clarity, transparency 
and simplicity, it was perhaps useful to make these two remarks. And 
                                                 
15 Note that the news conference is broadcast live on the ECB website and on major cable television 
financial news providers, such as CNBC. The intraday statement is published on the ECB website at 12:45.  
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it is true, vigilance is not mentioned in the introductory remarks, as 
you very wisely remarked. [Emphasis added]16 
 
This example illustrates two important points. First, the ECB is able to move asset prices using 
words alone, without any need for implementing policy deeds. Second, the immediate response 
of the futures price is consistent with semi-strong form informational efficiency. 
2)  On 31 March 2004, financial markets assigned a probability of around 70% that the ECB 
would cut its policy rate in the near future.17 
  On 1 April, Trichet turned market expectations upside down. In particular, he declared 
that: “On the basis of our regular economic and monetary analysis, we have not changed our 
assessment that the current stance of monetary policy remains in line with the maintenance of 
price stability over the medium term”. Thus, he signalled that the ECB was not going to change 
its policy rate in the near future by using the keyword “in line” (cf. glossary in Table 1). As 
shown in Figure 2 (b), the market reacted immediately: the 3-month futures rate jumped up. The 
probability of a policy rate cut was drastically reduced. 
3)  At the beginning of November 2005, the ECB left its policy rate on hold. However, 
Trichet said the Bank remained highly vigilant on inflation and stood ready to raise interest rates. 
He added: “We stand ready to move any time when it is required by our mandate and by the 
situation … we are very clear that we clearly could move any time.” 
  On Friday afternoon 18 November at around 14, at the European Banking Congress in 
Frankfurt, Trichet told the press that: “After two years and a half of maintaining rates at a 
historical low, I consider that the Governing Council is ready to take a decision to move interest 
rates from the present level in order to take into account the level of risk.” Panel (c) of Figure 2 
clearly shows that traders immediately placed bets that the ECB would increase the policy rate in 
December: the 3-month futures rate jumped up steeply.18 
  The takeaway of this last example is that, as long as it is not fully anticipated, ECB 
communication is able to move asset prices on any day, not only during Governing Council 
scheduled meeting days. 
                                                 
16 Note that the ECB Governing Council meeting of June 2006 was held outside Frankfurt (in Madrid) and 
it featured a policy rate increase of 25 basis points, as Trichet anticipated in April, while in May 2006 there 
was no Repo change. 
17 This probability is computed by using market-based measures of monetary policy expectations, i.e. the 
implied rates from the Euribor yield curve, and an ordered probit regression (whose methodology is 
described in Section 5) with five dependent variables: policy rate increases of 50 or 25 basis points, no 
change in the policy rate, policy rate cuts of 25 or 50 basis points. 
18 For example, Marius Daheim, a fixed-income analyst at WestLB AG in London, commented for 
Bloomberg (www.bloomberg.com, last accessed on 19 November 2005): “We would be surprised if 
Trichet would come out with such a strong statement if he was not sure he had the backing of the entire 
ECB Council.” 
 9
4)  Finally, Panels (d) and (e) report two cases where the news is represented by ECB 
monetary policy actions rather than by announcements on its overall monetary policy stance. 
Note that futures prices adjust immediately: in both cases it took less than 60 seconds to 
completely price in the monetary policy shock. 
  Indeed, it can be shown econometrically19 that monetary policy shocks, defined as the 
difference between the one-month Euribor rate quoted at 10:00 and the new Repo rate 
communicated at 12:45, are incorporated in less than five minutes. In this respect, it seems that 
financial markets understand numbers better than words.20 
 
3.3 Qualitative analysis of volumes and number of transactions 
 
  In this subsection in order to better understand the relationship between the price 
discovery process and ECB communication, we present some qualitative results on average 
number of transactions ticks, a proxy for the market activity, and volumes by distinguishing 
between Governing Council meeting days and all other trading days. In other words, we analyze 
how futures price volatility behaves in Governing Council days compared to all other days. 
  Figure 3 shows that the five-minute average number of transactions is substantially 
higher on Governing Council meeting days (full sample January 2000 – June 2006). A value 
larger than zero indicates that monetary policy decisions and communication induce a larger 
number of transactions than could be considered “normal” had the announcements not been 
made. For instance, a value of one indicates that the five-minute average number of transactions 
in that time window has been twice as much during Governing Council meeting days compared 
to all other trading days. Of course, the greater the news content of an announcement, the 
stronger the financial market activity should be.   
  It is eye-catching that there are two peaks: the first one corresponds closely to the new 
Repo rate announcements (12:45), while the second one takes place at the starting of the ECB 
President press conference (13:30). Market expectations seem to be quite heterogeneous at the 
time of the surprise, but then they start to converge.21 It is interesting to note that the convergence 
                                                 
19 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
20 This claim should be taken with caution because the monetary policy decision and the press conference 
announcement are two different kinds of news items. The former concerns a fact about the immediate 
future, while the latter is a probability assessment about the near future. 
21 Recall that according to no trade theorems (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Chapter 14) it is impossible for 
risk-averse agents take opposing sides of the same purely speculative bet under common knowledge. 
Hence, by using the contra-positive argument, if we observe trade market participants should have 
heterogeneous views. Note that we are abstracting from noise trader and portfolio rebalancing 
considerations. In particular, even if a monetary policy action or announcement is fully anticipated by 
market participants, it may still trigger portfolio adjustments by those agents who deviated from on average 
(correct) expectations. 
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is much faster for monetary policy shocks than for news shock. Apparently, quantitative 
announcements are easier to interpret than qualitative ones. 
  Figure 4 plots the ratio between futures price volatility on Governing Council meeting 
days with respect to all other days. 22 Again, two pieces of news seem to systematically hit the 
market. Moreover, it is clear that futures prices incorporate the first one, the monetary policy 
shock, very quickly. 
  These findings are completely corroborated if we use average volumes rather than either 
average number of transactions or asset price volatility. In Figure 5 we plot the ratio between 
average volumes on Governing Council meeting days and all other days for the sample period 
July 2003 – June 2006.23 Contrary to Figure 3 and 4, financial market participants’ expectations 
of future monetary policy actions now seem to be less heterogeneous than their expectations 
about ECB announcements.  
  This result is also confirmed by Figure 6, which plots the ratio between the average 
number of transactions on Governing Council meeting days and all other days restricting the 
sample period to July 2003 – June 2006. 
  A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that ECB monetary policy actions have 
recently become more predictable than at the beginning of its life. Indeed, Figure 7 plots the 
monetary policy shock24 for the whole sample (January 1999 – June 2006) and shows that its 
absolute value is much smaller nowadays. Recall also that from June 2003 to December 2005 the 
ECB did not move its policy rate. 
Hence, on Governing Council meeting days two pieces of news systematically hit 
financial markets: the ECB policy rate decision (standard in the literature), and the explanation of 
its monetary policy stance. In order to describe central bank monetary policy we need two 
dimensions: both the current policy rate and its future path. We conclude that, at least 
qualitatively, financial markets seem to pay attention to both news items. 
 
4  Tick-by-tick data: econometric results 
 
In this section we estimate the impact of unexpected central bank announcements on the 
short-end of the term structure, using a new tick-by-tick dataset from the Euribor futures market  
Since we are interested in investigating and measuring only the innovations in 
expectations caused by the ECB President’s press conference, we restrict our econometric 
                                                 
22 We use the absolute deviation of the (5-minute window) futures prices because it better captures the 
autocorrelation and the seasonality of the data (Piccinato et al., 1999) compared to the more usual standard 
deviation definition. For completeness, the latter measure of the volatility is also computed. There are no 
significant differences between the two definitions. 
23 Recall that we do not have volume data before July 2003. 
24 In Figure 7, we shift down monetary policy shocks by 0.11, which captures the equilibrium (liquidity and 
risk) spread between the one-month Euribor and the Repo rate. 
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analysis to Governing Council meeting days. In other words, we apply a standard event-study 
approach.25 
The initial task of conducting an event study is to identify the so-called event window, 
the period over which the asset price involved in the event is examined. 
We first introduce some definitions and notations. Let the event take place today (date t) 
at time t2 and define the event window between the interval t1 and t3. The timing sequence is 
illustrated in Figure 8. 
Our goal is to analyse the abnormal asset price change between t3 (post-event window) 
and t1 (estimation period). The abnormal asset price change is defined as the difference between 
actual ex-post security price change over the event window and its normal change. In turn, the 
normal change is defined as the change that would be expected if the event did not take place. In 
the literature, there are two common choices for modelling the normal return (cf. Campbell et al., 
1997, p. 153): the constant-mean-price-change model (used later in this chapter) and the market 
model. The first model assumes that the mean change is constant over time. The second posits 
that there is a stable linear relationship between the market movements and the security return. 
In order to check whether financial markets react to ECB communication, it is crucially 
important to realize that the news does not consist of the ECB announcement itself but rather by 
its unexpected component, i.e. the difference between what the ECB declares and what the 
market expects the ECB to declare. Therefore, to verify empirically the effectiveness of ECB 
words, we need to proceed in two steps. First, we have to pin down what the market expects the 
ECB to declare. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of asset prices to the news shock. 
We first posit and then verify empirically that the market tries to predict the ECB 
announcement through the following regression: 
 
Et1 [Indext2] = α + γ1 (ft1 – RNEW) + γ2 Indext1      (1) 
 
where Et1 [.] stands for the expectation conditional on time t1 information set, that is 
immediately before the ECB President press conference takes place. α is a constant and γ are 
regression coefficients. ft1 stands for the Euribor futures rate quoted on day t from t1 averaged 
over a 15-minute window.26 RNEW stands for the new Repo rate level communicated at time 12:45. 
                                                 
25 See Mackinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997, Chapter 4) for a survey of the event study 
methodology. In this case, a clear advantage of using an event-study analysis is that it can attenuate or even 
eliminate the joint hypothesis problem intrinsic in all statistical tests of the market efficient hypothesis (i.e., 
market efficiency must be tested jointly with an asset pricing model). In other words, we do not need to 
specify a model of market equilibrium. Moreover, the way we measure daily abnormal innovations in 
market expectations (our dependent variable) has little impact on inferences (cf. Brown and Warner, 1985). 
26 We use a 15-minute average quotation rather than specific ticks, since the initial reaction of bond prices 
to the “unexpected” ECB announcement may be larger (overshooting) than its “true” effect (cf. Faust et 
al., 2004). Asset prices should incorporate news instantaneously but actually do not. This procedure may 
introduce a possible bias in our estimations (cf. Blume and Stambaugh, 1983). Nevertheless, we think that 
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We assume that Index follows an AR (1) process: the economic environment usually does 
not change too much in the course of one month 
Moreover, if the futures rate (net of the risk premium already captured by α 27) is higher 
than the new level of the Repo rate, then the market expects the ECB to increase its policy rate in 
the near future. Hence, other things being equal, it expects a greater value of Index to be 
announced. In other words, if the very short-end of the term structure is upward sloping, a 
hawkish declaration is likely. Vice versa, if the short-end of the term structure is downward 
sloping, then the market expects the ECB to cut its policy rate in the near future. It expects a 
dovish announcement.28 
Note that to be successful, an event study has to identify precisely both the date of the 
event and the new (unexpected) information released. Obviously, in a rational marketplace, prices 
do not respond to old information. The issue of anticipated announcements is successfully dealt 
by our approach, since we use the very latest (indeed, real-time) information to construct market 
expectations about ECB declarations, viz. the slope of the term structure immediately before the 
ECB President press conference takes place.. 
In order to have a straightforward interpretation of our empirical results we have firstly 
used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with White-t statistics (White, 1980). Table 2 
reports the estimated OLS coefficients of Equation (1) for the period January 2000 – June 2006.29 
The independent variables explain 80% of the announced tone of ECB President’s 
declaration. The coefficient on the previous month announcement (γ1) belongs to (0,1) implying a 
stable AR process. The coefficient on the slope of the term structure is around one and is also 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Hence, a difference between the futures rate and 
the ECB policy rate of 100 basis points (i.e., 1%) implies that financial market participants 
expect, ceteris paribus, a higher level of our wording indicator of around 1 point. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                 
this bias is not important since we consider a very liquid market. Ideally, we want to give more 
importance to a quotation price that corresponds to a high traded volume. However, we can not construct 
average futures prices weighted by volumes, since volume data are available only from July 2003. 
Note that none of the econometric results reported in this paper would change if we used a 30-minute 
window rather than a 15-minute one to compute average futures rates (results not reported but available 
upon request). 
27 On the one hand, the futures contract is different from a Repo contract stipulated with the central bank. 
On the other, the futures contract refers (more or less) to a three-month-ahead three-month-forward rate, 
while the Repo refers to an immediate one-month-forward rate. Hence, a more sophisticated approach 
would consider a risk premium that varies over time. In this case, business cycle indicators, such as the 
default spread (i.e., a return increase from high-grade to low-grade bonds, from bonds to stocks, and from 
large to small stocks) and term spread (i.e., premium for maturity risks form long-term to short-term 
securities), track risk premium dynamics. 
28 Of course, our implicit maintained hypothesis is that financial markets form expectations rationally 
using all available information. 
29 Our dataset starts in January 1999. However, on the one side we consider the year 1999 as a learning 
period to well interpret ECB announcements. On the other, the practitioners whom we consulted 
suggested us that the Euribor futures market was not very liquid in the beginning. This fact is confirmed 
by volume and number of tick data in 1999 compared to the following years. 
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the constant is very close to zero, indicating that there is no bias in the ECB assessment of the 
balance of risks. 
Figure 9 shows the futures rate response to unexpected hawkish, neutral and dovish 
announcements made by the ECB President during the monthly press conference. A statement is 
defined hawkish when the news surprise, the difference between Indext2 and Et1 [Indext2] as given 
by Equation (1), is higher than the median of the positive news shocks observed in our sample 
period (i.e. 0.184). Vice versa, a statement is defined dovish when the news surprise is lower than 
the median negative news shock observed in our sample period (i.e. -0.367). In the remaining 
cases, the central bank statement is classified as neutral.30 
Overall, the price response is consistent with the sentiment of the news. Indeed, futures 
rate increase after an unexpected hawkish announcement, decrease after a dovish one, and are 
basically unaffected by neutral declarations. 
However, there are marked differences in the pattern and magnitude of the responses. In 
particular, the reaction to future monetary tightening announcement is much stronger (almost 
double size) than to monetary easing statements. Moreover, dovish announcements are usually 
followed by a small and quick reversion: it seems that market participants need more time, 
around one hour, to correctly interpret monetary easing announcements. This phenomenon can be 
due to the difficulty of market participants in understanding the de facto almost lexicographic 
ECB utility function, where price stability represents the primary objective. Only without 
prejudice to it, the European monetary authority can legitimately pursue other objectives such as 
employment and output.31  
So far, a dovish ECB statement has been characterized by two components (see, for 
example, the excerpts reported in the Appendix): no risk to price stability together with 
contemporaneous downward economic danger. It turns out that traders need not only the 
information contained in the introductory statement to the monthly press conference, but also its 
questions and answers, and some additional processing time, to correctly distinguish a neutral 
statement, where only no risk to price stability is reported, from a dovish declaration.   
We now test econometrically the effectiveness of ECB communication by estimating the 
following regression: 
                                                 
30 Note that Figure 9 is qualitatively unaffected if we use the third quartile (75%), rather than the median, to 
define the unexpected tone of the announcement. 
31 Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty states: “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain 
price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the 
Community as laid down in Article 2” [i.e., “the objectives of the Union are a high level of employment 
and sustainable and non-inflationary growth”]. Moreover, according to the ECB website 
(http://www.ecb.int/mopo/intro/html/objective.en.html, last accessed on 15 August 2006): “The Treaty 
establishes a clear hierarchy of objectives for the Eurosystem. It assigns overriding importance to price 
stability. The Treaty makes clear that ensuring price stability is the most important contribution that 
monetary policy can make to achieve a favourable economic environment and a high level of 
employment.” 
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ft3 – ft1 = α + β NSt2 + εt3        (2) 
 
where NSt2 stands for news surprise just after ECB announcements. The rest of the 
notation is the same as above. 
Table 3 reports the estimations for three different time windows, specifically for t3 = 
14:45, 15:45 and 16:45, and t1 = 13:15 (all averaged for a 15-minute interval). 
 It turns out that the coefficient on the news shock (β) is always positive (as expected), 
and statistically significant at the 1% level: the news shock can systematically explain the futures 
price change around the time of ECB President’s announcements. 
Table 3 suggests that the ECB can influence the money market interest rates to some 
extent simply by using words, rather than deeds, such as a change in its policy rate. For example, 
when the ECB President declares: “It is imperative to contain upward pressure to price stability”, 
while the market is expecting a value of Index of zero, the futures rate jumps up on average by 
about 4 basis points.32 This finding shows that the ECB unexpected announcements have a 
significant and sizeable impact on futures prices. 
So far, we have shown that asset prices react to ECB communication, but how long does 
it take? In other words, what is the degree of efficiency (i.e., the speed with which prices 
incorporate information) of the Euribor futures market? We answer this question, and hence we 
measure the speed of futures price response to ECB announcements,  by estimating the following 
regression for different ft : 
 
f17:00 – f13:15 = α + β NSt2 + γ (ft – f13:15 ) + εt3      (3) 
 
 where ft stands for the (15-minute average) futures rate at time t. 
 Table 4 clearly indicates that as time unfolds futures rates incorporate more and more the 
news shock. At around 15:00, unexpected announcements are no longer significant. In other 
words, in about one hour after the ending of the press conference, futures prices have completely 
incorporated the news originating from the ECB President monthly press conference.33 
The seemingly quick adjustment in asset prices is consistent with the semi-strong form of 
market informational efficiency. In particular, widespread profitable trading opportunities do not 
persist for long.  
                                                 
32 Because of attenuation bias due to measurement error in the explanatory variable (Johnston and 
DiNardo, page 154) of Equation (2) (also due to the artificial discreteness of our wording indicator), this 
number should be interpreted as a lower bound on ECB ability in moving asset prices by simply making 
announcements. 
33 These results should not be taken as completely definitive. Our relatively small sample size leads to 
higher standard errors, making it difficult to estimate the precise speed of price adjustment and, 
specifically, when the adjustment is completely over. 
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To further illustrate this last finding, we also estimate the effect of news shocks after 
15:00. In Table 5 we report the estimations of the following regression: 
 
ft4 – ft3 = α + β NSt2 + εt3        (4) 
 
 where both t4 and t3 are placed after the ECB President’s announcement. More precisely, 
t3 is the 15-minute average price quotation starting at 15:00 and t4 is the 15-minute average 
starting at 17:30, and 9:00 and 11:00 of the day after the ECB Governing Council meeting. 
As we expect, neither the constant nor the news shock can systematically explain the 
futures price change. 
 
5  Robustness checks: Ordered Probit and generated regressor issue 
 
5.1 Ordered Probit on Index 
   
There is a logical problem in estimating Equations (1) by OLS. The wording indicator 
variable, Indext2, takes only discrete values (i.e., integers from -2 to +2). But OLS predicts by 
construction a continuous dependent variable. We check whether our results hold even if we 
estimate expected ECB announcements using ordered probit regression. 
Before presenting empirical results, in order to understand the mechanics of discrete 
dependent variable models, we briefly review the underlying econometric methods. 
Ideally, we want to estimate the following regression: 
 
[Indext2]OPT= α + γ1 (ft1 – RNEW) + γ 2 Indext1 + εt     (5) 
 
where εt is assumed to be normally distributed N(0,σ 2) and captures ECB 
“communication” errors and potential regression misspecifications. [Indext2]OPT stands for the 
Governing Council’s optimal announced hawkish level at time t2. 
However, we cannot estimate Equation (5) directly, because [Indext2]OPT is not observed 
by market participants (i.e., it is a latent variable). Instead, both the public and the econometrician 
observe the realized [Indext2], which as we mentioned earlier takes five different values (and 
hence is a censored variable). In particular, 
 
[Indext2] = –2   if   [Indext2]OPT≤ δ1 
[Indext2] = –1   if   δ1 < [Indext2]OPT≤ δ2 
[Indext2] = 0   if   δ2 < [Indext2]OPT≤ δ3 
[Indext2] = +1   if   δ3 < [Indext2]OPT≤ δ4 
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[Indext2] = +2   if   δ4 < [Indext2]OPT 
 
The realized Indext2 depends on the magnitude of the optimal Indext2 with respect to the 
threshold parameters δs, which are estimated jointly together with the regression coefficients of 
Equation (5). 
Since we use an ordered probit model, the probabilities of observing  
Indext2∈ {-2,-1,0,+1,+2} can be shown to be (cf. Ruud, 2003, chapter 27): 
 
Prob (Indext2 = -2) = Φ((δ1 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ) 
Prob (Indext2 = -1) = Φ((δ2 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ) - Φ((δ1 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ) 
Prob (Indext2 = 0) = Φ((δ3 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ) - Φ((δ2 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ)       (6) 
Prob (Indext2 = +1) = Φ((δ4 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ) - Φ((δ3 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ) 
Prob (Indext2 = +2) = 1- Φ((δ4 - γ1 (ft1 – RNEW)  - γ 2 Indext1)/σ)     
 
where Φ(.) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Moreover, we 
assume that δ0 = -∞ and δ5 = +∞. 
The log-likelihood function is: 
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where 1{.} stands for the indicator function, which takes value one when the event 
specified in brackets is true and zero otherwise. 
We can now estimate the regressor coefficients by maximizing (7) numerically with 
respect to them. Note that the constant term in (5) cannot be identified separately from the δs. 
Moreover, all coefficients are identified up to a proportionality factor: as standard in the 
literature, we normalize σ to one. 
Since the empirical reaction function is formulated in terms of the latent policy rate, the 
parameter estimates do not have the usual interpretation: the marginal effect depends both on the 
dependent variable and on the time t of the explanatory variables, making them cumbersome to 
report. 
 The goodness of fit can be measured by the pseudo R2, also known as McFadden’s 
likelihood ratio index, which is given by: 
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pseudo R2 ≡ 1 – ln(L/L*)        (8) 
 
where L* stands for the value taken by the likelihood function when there are no time-
varying regressors. 
Note that (8) takes values ranging from 0 and 1 (as the standard R2). Moreover, it is 
related to a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that all slope parameters are zero (i.e.,  
-2ln(L/L*)). 
In Table 6 we report the estimation of Equation (1) using ordered probit regression. In 
particular, we have jointly estimated six regression coefficients: specifically γ1 and γ2 (see 
Equation 1), and four threshold parameters δs. 
All regressor coefficients are significantly different from zero much below the 1% 
critical level. The goodness of fit as measured by pseudo-R2 is also quite high. 
We construct market participants’ expectations about the ECB announcement as follows: 
 
∑
−=
⋅==
2
2
221 )Pr(][
i
ttt iiIndexIndexE        (9) 
  
 where Pr(Indext2) is computed analytically as shown in Equation (6). 
 We first redefine the news shock as the difference between our wording indicator, 
Indext2, and market expectations, Et1 [Indext2], derived in Equation (9). We then re-estimate all 
equations of Section 4 using our new measure of central bank unexpected declaration. 
 In general, all the econometric results presented in Section 4 hold both qualitatively and 
quantitatively (cf. Table 7, 8, and 9). 
 Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient of the news shock of Table 7 is 
systematically larger than in Table 3. Moreover, its significance level is also higher. These facts 
seem to suggest that the ordered probit regression copes better with the measurement error 
problem of the explanatory variable news shock. 
  
5.2 Generated regressor issue 
 
 So far the econometric estimations have been carried out in two steps. First, we 
determine market expectations about ECB announcements immediately before the start of the 
press conference. Then, we use the news shock to explain the futures price discovery process. In 
other words, in the second step we employ generated regressors (cf. Oxley and McAleer, 1993). 
 This fact may give rise to underestimated standard errors and hence to spurious 
significant regressor coefficients. In order to solve this issue and to check the statistical validity 
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of our conclusions, we also re-estimate the same regressions of the previous subsection all in one 
step. More formally, we estimate the following regression by OLS:34 
 
ft3 – ft1 = c1 + c2 ⋅ (Indext2 – c3⋅ (ft1 – RNEW) – c4⋅ (Indext1)) + εt3     
f17 – f13:15 = c1 + c2 ⋅ ( ft – f13:15 ) + c3 ⋅ (Indext2 – c4 ⋅ (ft1 – RNEW) – c5 ⋅ (Indext1)) + εt3   
ft4 – ft3 = c1 + c2 ⋅ (Indext2 – c3⋅ (ft1 – RNEW) – c4⋅ (Indext1)) + εt3     
 
 where cs are regressor coefficients, and the rest of the notation is the same as before. 
 Tables 10, 11, and 12 show that all the econometric results continue to hold both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
6  Discussion 
 
6.1  Testing the market efficiency hypothesis in real time 
 
In this paper we investigate the effect of a new type of news item, specifically the 
information originating from central bank announcements (cf. next subsection), in real time. 
Since the early studies of market efficiency,35 many changes have taken place in security 
markets. In particular, the technology revolution of the last decade has dramatically accelerated 
the pace at which information becomes publicly available and at which market participants 
operate. For this reason, even though in practice prices do not respond instantaneously to news, 
nowadays market efficiency should really be gauged in real time (Busse and Green, 2002). 
One major contribution of this paper consists in providing a methodology to pin down the 
true real-time news. Obviously, in a rational market place, prices do not respond to old 
information. 
We address this issue by defining the news (shock) as the difference between what the 
ECB announces and what the market expects the ECB to announce. Notice that in our empirical 
exercise market participants form expectations rationally (using all available information) and in 
real time, just immediately before the press conference takes place. 
European money market rates should not be driven by the tone of the ECB declaration, 
but rather by its unexpected component. For instance, if the ECB had been dovish in the last three 
months, a further dovish announcement today would not be completely unexpected. 
                                                 
34 Alternatively, bootstrap methods can be used to artificially introduce more uncertainty in the standard 
error estimations. 
35 For two excellent surveys, see Fama (1991 and 1970).  
 19
To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 by 
adding the tone of ECB announcements, our wording indicator Indext2, as right-hand side 
explanatory variable. More formally, we estimate the following equations: 
 
ft3 – ft1 = α + β1 NSt2 + β2 Indext2 + εt3 
f17:00 – f13:15 = α + β1 NSt2 + β2 Indext2 + γ (ft – f13:15 ) + εt3 
 
We find (see Table 13 and 14) that the coefficient of the news shock is statistically and 
economically significant as before. Instead, in only one case the coefficient on Index is 
marginally significant (p-value 0.047), however it has the wrong sign (i.e. an hawkish ECB 
announcement decreases market rates). 
The news shock is equal to Index in only one special case, i.e. when the market expects a 
neutral ECB announcement. In general, if we use Index, instead of the news shock, as 
explanatory variable our model is misspecified and of course the estimations are biased.  
The above observation, namely only unexpected announcements move asset prices, has 
important implications for studying the price adjustment process that follows other news events, 
such as analysts’ recommendations. In particular, in this latter case the news is not represented by 
the face value of the broker’s recommendation, viz. buy or sell, but rather by its unexpected 
component, the difference between the recommendation and what the market expects to be 
recommended. In other words, in order to have consistent and unbiased estimates, we need to 
construct a (real-time) measure of the news that is free of endogenous and anticipatory 
movements.36 
 Our study also adds to the empirical finance literature by assessing the degree of 
informational efficiency of a new European money market. By doing so, we address two 
shortcomings of the existing literature.  
 First, we analyze a money market while most empirical studies focus on the foreign 
exchange and stock market. Understanding the price formation process in the short-term interest 
rate market is crucial for central bankers, consumers and producers alike. On the one side, the 
efficacy of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy relies on a well developed financial 
system, and in particular on the existence of an efficient money market. On the other side, short-
term interest rates are important for households and firms saving and investment decisions 
because of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure37 and because of various forms of 
contractual indexation. 
                                                 
36 Note that Busse and Green (2202, page 422) recognize this problem but do not solve it. In fact, they 
observe: “The small response to positive [analysts’] reports during the Morning Call suggests that the 
segment provides information that is (…) not new.” 
37 This states that the d-day market interest rate can be expressed as the average of current and expected 
future overnight rates, plus a risk-liquidity premium. In other words, by an arbitrage argument, two 
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 Second, we investigate the efficiency property of a European financial market, while 
most finance literature studies US markets. Even though the euro area is a relatively new 
integrated economic region, nowadays euro-denominated financial assets are not only highly 
liquid and traded in well developed financial markets but also enough data are available for 
reliable econometric analysis. 
 
6.2  Central bank communication and monetary policy making 
 
Central bank communication and its effects on financial markets have recently received 
increasing attention in the monetary economics literature both theoretically (Woodford, 2005) 
and empirically (Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005a,b,c) Gerlach (2004), Heinemann and Ullrich 
(2005), Kohn and Sack (2003), Jansen and deHaan (2006a,b, 2005)). 
A possible explanation may be the substantial change in the way central banks 
communicate with the public, and more specifically with financial markets.38 Only twenty years 
ago monetary policy was surrounded by secrecy (Goodfriend, 1986), while nowadays there is a 
strong emphasis on central bank transparency (Ferguson, 2002 and Bernanke, 2004). 
Central bankers motivate the need for transparency on the basis of two main reasons (see, 
for example, Issing, 2005).39 First, since central banks are granted by legal status (at the very least 
instrument) independence, and their board is not democratically elected, good governance 
practices call for them to be accountable. In order to fulfill the basic requirement of 
accountability, central banks should be transparent. Second, transparency is a necessary 
ingredient to enhance the efficiency of monetary policy. Central banks can directly control only 
the very short-run nominal interest rates, but aggregate-spending decisions are closely related to 
interest rates of all maturities.40 Therefore, the management of financial market expectations has 
become a crucial instrument in monetary authority's hands to affect the overall course of the 
economy. Sound credibility and good communication skills (to direct market expectations) are 
essential tools for the effective working of a modern central bank. 
                                                                                                                                                 
equivalent borrowing options should have the same expected cost (cf. for example Dotsey and Otrok, 
1995). 
38 In turn this may be due to a paradigm shift in central bank practices. In fact, as Woodford (2003, page 
3) notes: “The adoption of ‘inflation targeting’ (…) is characterized not only by public commitment to an 
explicit target, but also by a commitment to explain the central bank's policy actions in terms of a 
systematic decision-making framework that is aimed at achieving this target”. In other words, 
transparency and communication have become an integral element in the definition of monetary policy. 
39 Carpenter (2002) and Geraats (2002) provide an excellent overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the transparency of monetary policy. 
40 Blinder (1998, page 30) notices: “the interest-sensitive components of aggregate demand react mainly 
to the real long rate while the central bank controls only the nominal short rate.” Indeed, Woodford 
entitles one paragraph of his monograph (2003) “Central banking as management of expectations”. 
Moreover, he explains (ibid., page 15): “Not only do expectations about monetary policy matter, but, at 
least under current conditions, very little else matters… the current level of overnight interest rate as such 
is of negligible importance for economic decisionmaking.”  
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 We provide clear and easily interpretable evidence that the conduct of modern monetary 
policy can be best described on two dimensions: both central bank actions and central bank 
words.41 
The type of analysis made by Kuttner (2001), based only on monetary policy shocks, 
(i.e., a single factor), seems to be not completely adequate to describe central bank interest rate 
setting behaviour. Nowadays, central banks have adopted a more and more transparent conduct of 
monetary policy up to pre-announcing their future policy moves. Hence, central banks mostly 
affect asset prices through their bias statements (a second policy instrument) by influencing 
financial market expectations of their future policy actions, rather than by unexpected deeds, i.e. 
monetary policy shocks. We show that the former effect is not only significant but has also a 
sizeable impact on futures prices. 
Like Rosa and Verga (2006), in this paper we also examine the effect of ECB 
communication on the price discovery process for the European money market rates. However, 
we use high-frequency intraday data rather than daily data.42 This is a crucial improvement 
because it allows to fully exploiting the unique institutional feature of ECB monetary policy 
conduct (i.e. on the same Governing Council meeting day, the ECB announces its policy decision 
and explains its monetary policy stance in two different points in time). Hence, we can 
distinguish one surprise, monetary policy shock, from the other, news shock.43 So, on the one 
side, we do not need to worry about the exogeneity assumption of the monetary policy shock. On 
the other, we do not need to implement complicated identification procedures.44 Moreover, on a 
typical Governing Council meeting day a large, potentially uncountable, number of news items 
hit the financial market, which make our estimates much more efficient, resulting in smaller 
standard errors in the coefficients of the news shock.45 
                                                 
41 Also Bomfim (2003) and Gurkaynak et al. (2005) find that at least two factors are required in order to 
capture adequately the effects of U.S. monetary policy on asset prices. They interpret the first one as the 
current federal funds target rate and the second one as the future path of policy, which is closely 
associated with FOMC announcements. We solve a related empirical exercise. However, as we use a very 
intuitive and simple approach, our results are much more straightforward to interpret. 
42 Moreover, we look at the Euribor futures market, instead of the Euribor market. 
43 Since writing this paper, we have learned that a very recent paper by Brand et al. (2006) also 
investigates the impact of ECB monetary policy decisions and communication on the yield curve by using 
high-frequency data. However, there remain important differences with the present work. First, the 
methodology is different: we show that the news shock explains innovations in futures prices, while they 
extract surprise measures from the money market yield curve. The dataset used is also different: we use 
futures tick-by-tick data from LIFFE (and we complement our analysis by studying volumes and number 
of transactions data), while they use real time quotes of deposit and swap rates from Reuters observed at 
five minute intervals.  
44 In this respect, Rigobon and Sack (2004) and Guimaraes and Goncalves (2006) solve the simultaneity 
problem through a heteroskedasticity-based method of identification. They exploit the fact that on days of 
FOMC meetings the variance of policy shocks increase. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) and Faust et al. 
(2003) both propose a high-frequency identification procedure. 
45 However, note that the regressor coefficients estimated using daily data are not biased as long as the kind 
of news that hit the market during Governing Council meeting days is not systematic. 
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Romer and Romer (2004) also develop a measure of unanticipated policy deliberations. 
They regress their previous (1989) measure of Federal Reserve’s intentions for the Federal funds 
rate around FOMC meetings on the Federal Reserve’s internal forecasts. However, they use 
simply one dimension to describe monetary policy conduct. 
In Figure 7 we show that the absolute magnitude of the monetary policy shocks has 
substantially decreased over time, and this is true even when the official rate has been changed. 
In the year the source of the surprise was often represented by the President press conference 
rather than by the announcement of the monetary policy decision. In this respect, a change in 
emphasis within the press conference has also taken place. In particular, in recent months the 
introductory statement has simply conveyed the overall monetary policy stance communicated by 
the Governing Council, and its content was similar to what the market expected, while through 
the Questions and Answers section the ECB now sends fairly unambiguous signals about the 
likely future dynamics of policy rates (see Table 15). 
 There is an open question that this paper brings to the fore: if the words of the ECB 
President can be easily and unambiguously quantified in the way we suggest, then the question 
presents itself why this piece of information is not presented in a precise numerical form, 
analogous to the ECB policy rate decision. 
At the moment there is a debate in central bank circles and academic economists alike 
about the optimality of explicitly announcing the future path of policy rates (Svensson (2006a)46, 
Giavazzi and Wyplosz (2006a, b), and Goodhart (2006, 2005); see Table 16 for a highlight of the 
pros and cons). 
 We think that the ECB is following Svensson’s advice of publishing conditional policy 
rate forecasts. On the one hand, by using sentences such as “[we] never pre-commit to any kind 
of level” or “as far as we are concerned, we will do what is necessary to do in our own 
judgement” or “we will do what is necessary to do”,47 the ECB is clearly pointing out the 
conditional nature of its bias announcements. On the other hand, even though the ECB employs 
words rather than fan charts to announce its future policy intentions, this difference of form is 
more philosophical than substantial given the high uncertainty surrounding quantitative policy 
rate projections published in fan charts (they usually feature large confidence bands). 
 It seems to us that the ECB is also following Goodhart’s suggestion (2005) to be 
cautious. In fact, it announces policy rate intentions only for the very near future, anticipating that 
                                                 
46 He notes that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank have set a model for 
other central banks. These two banks publish projections two years ahead, with fan charts 
indicating the degree of uncertainty and with ample discussion and justification of the projections, 
including alternative scenarios, cross-checking with alternative policy rules, and the application 
of a list of criteria of optimal instrument-rate projections. 
47 Cf. for example the press conference held on 31 August 2006, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2006/html/is060831.en.html (last accessed on 1 October 2006). 
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after this period the uncertainty of the economic environment is getting too large: after all central 
banks are not omniscient! 
 As we mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, central banks directly control only a 
very short-term interest rate, while they need to influence interest rates at all maturities in order to 
conduct an effective monetary policy and thus achieve their aims. Moreover, monetary policy 
makers are much more interested in the futures price impact of their announcements over longer 
horizons, rather than the precise estimates of the timing and impact of news, i.e. its initial 
reaction. 
 Table 17 provides the futures price change for four weeks, 22 trading days, following the 
ECB President press conference. Unexpected hawkish or dovish announcements are defined as in 
Section 4, specifically as in Figure 9. 
 It is interesting to see that the initial impact to ECB statements is part of a larger, long-
term reaction. However, the evidence indicates that there is an asymmetric long-term response. 
On the one hand, the futures price change becomes increasingly negative and increasingly 
significant during the month after a dovish announcement. This statistical pattern is uncovered 
despite standard errors increase with the measurement interval, and so even if the multi-day tests 
lack power against the alternatives that the price react permanently to the tone of the central bank 
declaration over the following month.48 On the other hand, futures prices increase, but not in a 
statistically significant way, by about 3-4 basis points after an hawkish announcement and 
maintain the new level over the following month. 
 Overall, we provide strong and economically relevant evidence that central bank 
communication impacts futures prices permanently, and not only transitorily. Hence, central 
bankers’ announcements seem to be a very powerful tool to systematically drive market 
expectations and eventually, through it, the actual evolution of the real economy. 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
Event study analysis is now an important part of finance, especially corporate finance 
where it is used to highlight empirical regularities in the response of stock prices to investment 
decisions, financing decisions, and changes in corporate control. In this paper, we apply its 
methods in order to investigate the reaction of asset prices to unexpected central bank 
announcements.  
Given the unique institutional features of ECB monetary policy conduct, we think that 
high-frequency intraday is the proper frequency for our event-study analysis. Since the news 
shock and monetary policy shock hit the financial market in two different point in time, not only 
                                                 
48 Technically, future prices follow a unit-root process, thus the variance of futures price changes between 
date t and t+m is proportional to m. 
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we can tell apart one surprise from the other, but we can also investigate their effect 
independently. 
The interpretation of central bankers’ statements and actions is of considerable 
importance to monetary policymakers, financial market participants, and more generally the 
overall public. 
In this paper we analyze the relationship between central bank words and deeds and 
changes in asset prices. More specifically, we examine the effect of European Central Bank 
communication on the price discovery process in the Euribor futures market using a new tick-by-
tick dataset.  
First, we find that the number of transactions and the number of exchanged futures 
contracts (volume) data confirm that two news items systematically hit financial markets on 
Governing Council meeting days: ECB policy rate decision and the explanation of its monetary 
policy stance.   
Second, we show that when the tone of the press conference is different from what the 
market expects, the futures rate experience a statistically and economically significant quick (less 
than an hour) reaction. Put it differently, we show that communication is an important tool in the 
process of conducting monetary policy stance. 
Finally, our results suggest that the Euribor futures market is semi-strong form 
informational efficient. 
The fact that the ECB is able to move asset prices by simply using words seems to 
indicate that financial markets believe that the European Central Bank does what it says it will 
do. In other words, even if it is a relatively young central bank, the ECB has already acquired 
some reputation for telling the truth. Hence, the ECB has already built up some credibility 
capital. However, credibility is a matter of degree and this paper does not answer the question of 
how credible the Central Bank is. 
There are of course several important issues not considered here, which require further 
study. 
  To interpret an event study, we need to assess quantitatively our ability to detect the 
presence of an abnormal asset price change. In other words, we also need to evaluate the power 
of the test, that is the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis (i.e., ECB unexpected 
announcements have no impact on the behaviour of asset prices). 
  In this paper we make specific assumptions about the distribution of abnormal price 
changes. Hence we use parametric estimation methods. Alternatively, non parametric methods 
(such as either the sign or the rank test), which are free of specific distributional assumptions, are 
available and can be used. 
 As a first step, we restricted our sample to Governing Council meeting days. It would be 
interesting to extend our analysis to include all ECB President speeches. We would thus be able 
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to break down news shocks further into two separate factors: path (change in the near-term path 
of policy expectations) and time (changes in the expected timing of policy speeches). Moreover, 
we could also disentangle and separate news about the future path of monetary policy from news 
about the future economic outlook i.e., the evolution of macroeconomic or monetary variables, 
such as output, price indexes, exchange rates, M3 growth, etc. 
We test market efficiency in real time. We look at the effects of ECB President 
announcements on Euribor futures rates using a new high-frequency dataset. We explain price 
changes but we do not statistically investigate the informational content of the number of 
observations and volumes (number of exchanged contracts) within a specific time interval 
(Demos and Goodhart, 1996). 
We apply standard event study econometric methods, but at the same time we overlook 
market microstructure issues, such as non-synchronous trading effects (transactions usually take 
place at time intervals of irregular length and thus transaction data are sampled at irregular 
random intervals) and price discreteness (prices are always quoted in discrete units). We believe 
that the three-month futures market institutional structure can be safely ignored for our purpose 
of assessing the response of asset prices to ECB unexpected announcements. However, it is 
possible that our results could be biased (cf. Campbell et al., 1997, Chapter 3), the computation of 
further diagnostic tests could be particularly fruitful to gauge the robustness of our preliminary 
findings. 
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Table 1.  – Glossary of ECB’s official statements and their ranking 
 
 
ECB’s main statements: the most important keywords Index 
Imperative that upward pressure to be contained – Risks [to price stability] are 
upward (upside) – The risks to price stability are confirmed (or: remain) – Vigilant 
(vigilance) [with regard to upside risks to price stability]– Close monitored (or: 
continuous close attention) [upside risks] – Several [upward] factors need to be 
monitored carefully 
+2 
Both confident and vigilant (or: Good however vigilant) [upside risks] – Upward 
pressure remains contained – A number of (or: Some) upside risks need to be 
carefully monitored – Alert to emerging of upward risks – Vigilance with regard to 
the materialisation of upside risks 
+1 
Appropriate – Favorable – Compatible – Consistent – In line – Balanced – Absence 
of significant  (or: No strong) pressures either upwards or downwards – The 
downside risks have disappeared – 
0 
Favorable, but there are some [downside] risks – Appropriate but remain downside 
risks – Downside risks are not vanished – Some of the downward risks had 
materialised  
-1 
Consistent, but carefully monitor all [downside] risks to economic growth – 
Balanced but monitor closely all [downside] factors – Monitor carefully all 
[downside] factors relevant to economic growth – Downside risks are still relevant 
– Economic slowdown is still cause for concern – [Strong] downside risks for 
economic activity – Monitor closely the downside risks to economic growth. 
-2 
 
 
 
ECB’s main statements: Comparisons Index 
Somewhat less favorable – [Price perspectives are] less satisfactory but further 
evidence is needed – move towards the upside +1 
Confirmed –  not altered – not changed (or: no fundamental changes) 0 
More balanced – Inflationary pressures have further diminished (or: are lower, are 
easing) -1 
 
NOTE: Source: Rosa and Verga (2006) 
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Figure 1. – Plot of 3-month implicit Euribor and its futures contract 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Daily observations, January 1999 – June 2006. The 3-month-forward 3-month ahead Euribor is 
quoted at 10, while the plotted 3-month futures rate is quoted at its closure price. 
 
 
 
Futures 
Euribor 
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Figure 2. – 3-month Euribor futures tick-by-tick rate: 
 
 
 
a) 6 April 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 1 April 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) 18 November 2005 
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 d) 8 June 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e) 10 May 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The contracted futures rate equals 100 less the futures price. 
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Figure 3. – Ratio of average number of transactions per quarter of an hour  
(from January 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Plot of the ratio between the average number of transaction on Governing Council meeting days 
and all other days. Two vertical lines indicate 12:45 and 13:30 London time. 
 
Figure 4. – 5-minute futures price volatility (from January 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Plot of the ratio between futures price volatility (measured as the 5-minute absolute deviation) on 
Governing Council meeting days with respect to all other days. 
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Figure 5. – Ratio of average volume (from July 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Plot of the ratio between the average number of transaction on Governing Council meeting days 
and all other days. Two vertical lines indicate 12:45 and 13:30 London time. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. – Ratio of average number of transactions per quarter of an hour 
(from July 2003) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Plot of the ratio between the average number of transaction on Governing Council meeting days 
and all other days. Two vertical lines indicate 12:45 and 13:30 London time. 
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Figure 7. – Monetary policy shocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The monetary policy shock is defined as the difference between the new Repo rate communicated 
at 12:45, and the one-month Euribor rate quoted at 10:00. We also subtract the mean equilibrium spread 
(0.11) between the Repo and the one-month Euribor rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. – Time line for the event study on ECB announcements 
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Table 2. – Auxiliary regression to measure the expected ECB announcement (Futures rates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. – Futures rate reactions to central bank announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The chart plots average futures rate changes following unexpected hawkish (red line - triangle), 
neutral (green line – circle), and dovish (blue line - square) ECB announcements on Governing Council 
meeting days. A statement is defined hawkish when the news surprise, the difference between Indext2 and 
Et1 [Indext2] as given by Equation (1), is higher than the median of the positive news shocks observed in 
our sample period (i.e. 0.184). A statement is defined dovish when the news surprise is lower than the 
median negative news shock observed in our sample period (i.e. -0.367). In the remaining cases, the central 
bank statement is classified as neutral. A solid marker denotes that the futures price change is significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level. 
 
Constant 0.043 (0.010) 
F13:15 – RNew 
1.008** 
(0.261) 
Indext1 
0.649** 
(0.076) 
R2 0.791 
Adj. R2 0.785 
Observations 69 
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Table 3. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
 dependent variable ft3 – ft1 
 
 t3 = 14:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 15:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 16:45 
t1 = 13:15 
Constant 0.002 (0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
NSt2 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
R2 0.091 0.010 0.112 
Adj. R2 0.077 0.086 0.099 
Observations 69 69 69 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. – Time needed to incorporate the news shock (Future rates), 
dependent variable f17 – f13:15 
 
 t = 14:15 t = 14:30 t = 14:45 t = 15:00 
Constant 0.002 (0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
ft – f13:15 
1.112** 
(0.092) 
1.068** 
(0.080) 
1.064** 
(0.064) 
1.055** 
(0.058) 
NSt2 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
R2 0.752 0.804 0.829 0.863 
Adj. R2 0.744 0.798 0.813 0.859 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
dependent variable ft4 – ft3 
 
 t4 = 17:30 
t3 = 15:00 
t4° = 9:00 
t3 = 15:00 
t4° = 11:00 
t3 = 15:00 
Constant 0.001 (0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
NSt2 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
R2 0.027 0.057 0.051 
Adj. R2 0.012 0.043 0.037 
Observations 69 69 68 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
° stands for the morning of the day after the Governing Council meeting. 
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Table 6. – Auxiliary regression to measure the expected ECB announcement 
using Ordered Probit 
 
 
2.688** 
ft1 – RNEW (0.713) 
1.374** 
Indext1 (0.224) 
-2.681** 
δ1 (0.399) 
-1.680** δ2 (0.352) 
0.974** δ3 (0.283) 
3.038** δ4 (0.447) 
Log Likelihood -48.322 
Pseudo-R2 0.529 
Observations 69 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is ML – Ordered Probit (Quadratic hill climbing). One and two stars denote 
significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
 dependent variable ft3 – ft1 
 
 t3 = 14:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 15:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 16:45 
t1 = 13:15 
Constant 0.002 (0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
NSt2 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
0.022** 
(0.007) 
0.023** 
(0.006) 
R2 0.112 0.137 0.139 
Adj. R2 0.099 0.124 0.126 
Observations 69 69 69 
 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8. – Time needed to incorporate the news shock (Future rates), 
dependent variable f17 – f13:15 
 
 t = 14:15 t = 14:30 t = 14:45 t = 15:00 
Constant 0.002 (0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
ft – f13:15 
1.097** 
(0.091) 
1.055** 
(0.081) 
1.053** 
(0.064) 
1.049** 
(0.058) 
NSt2 
0.016** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
R2 0.732 0.809 0.821 0.863 
Adj. R2 0.754 0.803 0.826 0.860 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
dependent variable ft4 – ft3 
 
 t4 = 17:30 
t3 = 15:00 
t4° = 9:00 
t3 = 15:00 
t4° = 11:00 
t3 = 15:00 
Constant 0.001 (0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
NSt2 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
R2 0.028 0.050 0.045 
Adj. R2 0.013 0.036 0.030 
Observations 69 68 68 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
° stands for the morning of the day after the Governing Council meeting. 
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Table 10. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
dependent variable ft3 – ft1 
 
 t3 = 14:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 15:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 16:45 
t1 = 13:15 
c1 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.004) 
c2 
0.016* 
(0.006) 
0.019** 
(0.006) 
0.021** 
(0.006) 
c3 
2.548* 
(1.222) 
2.111 
(1.065) 
2.096* 
(0.945) 
c4 
0.649** 
(0.182) 
0.732** 
(0.192) 
0.638** 
(0.202) 
R2 0.177 0.169 0.162 
Adj. R2 0.139 0.131 0.123 
Observations 69 69 69 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 11. – Time needed to incorporate the news shock (Future rates), 
dependent variable f17 – f13:15 
 
 t = 14:15 t = 14:30 t = 14:45 t = 15:00 
c1 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
c2 
1.110** 
(0.108) 
1.073** 
(0.088) 
1.074** 
(0.071) 
1.061** 
(0.060) 
c3 
0.148** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
c4 
0.921 
(0.869) 
0.959 
(1.097) 
1.077 
(1.993) 
2.841 
(4.991) 
c5 
0.714** 
(0.217) 
0.605* 
(0.280) 
0.422 
(0.552) 
-0.283 
(1.840) 
R2 0.753 0.805 0.820 0.866 
Adj. R2 0.737 0.793 0.809 0.858 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 12. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
dependent variable ft4 – ft3 
 
 t4 = 17:30 
t3 = 15:00 
t4° = 9:00 
t3 = 15:00 
t4° = 11:00 
t3 = 15:00 
c1 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
c2 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
c3 
2.743 
(2.483) 
-0.307 
(1.353) 
0.535 
(1.232) 
c4 
0.185 
(0.689) 
0.811** 
(0.299) 
0.739* 
(0.330) 
R2 0.045 0.078 0.054 
Adj. R2 0.001 0.035 0.009 
Observations 69 68 68 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
° stands for the morning of the day after the Governing Council meeting. 
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Table 13. – Explanation of innovation in expectations (Future rates), 
 dependent variable ft3 – ft1 
 
 t3 = 14:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 15:45 
t1 = 13:15 
t3 = 16:45 
t1 = 13:15 
Constant 0.006 (0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
NSt2 
0.023** 
(0.006) 
0.026** 
(0.007) 
0.027** 
(0.007) 
Indext2 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
R2 0.157 0.160 0.148 
Adj. R2 0.131 0.135 0.122 
Observations 69 69 69 
 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. – Time needed to incorporate the news shock (Future rates), 
dependent variable f17 – f13:15 
 
 t = 14:15 t = 14:30 t = 14:45 t = 15:00 
Constant 0.002 (0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
ft – f13:15 
1.104** 
(0.097) 
1.074** 
(0.083) 
1.078** 
(0.068) 
1.069** 
(0.058) 
NSt2 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Indext2 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
R2 0.751 0.804 0.820 0.864 
Adj. R2 0.739 0.795 0.811 0.858 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
 
NOTE: Monthly observations on days of ECB Governing Council meetings, January 2000 – June 2006. 
The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares. Heteroskedasticity - Consistent standard errors in 
brackets. One and two stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 15. – Excerpts from the Questions and Answers section 
 of the ECB President press conference 
 
Date Excerpts 
6 October 2005 Question: My first question involves your choice of the words “strong vigilance”. We 
have not heard that phrase for several months and today I counted that we heard it 
four times ...  
Trichet: I said “strong vigilance” and I said that the present level of interest rates was 
“still appropriate”. And this is a little bit different from the previous language, you 
might remember, in the previous Governing Council meeting. You have to take that 
into account. 
3 November 2005 Question: Mr Trichet, can you tell us please: are you preparing for an interest rate 
rise?  
Trichet: I already said several times that we were not promising anybody that we 
would not move. And that we stand ready to move at any time when it is required by 
our mandate and by the situation. Today, and as I said in Athens – and we referred 
explicitly to the Athens judgement and assessment - we think that present interest 
rates are still appropriate, that strong vigilance is of the essence in the present 
situation and that inflationary risks are on the upside. I will only mention that. 
We are very clear that we can move at any time.  
 
Question: Did any Council members at today’s meeting propose increasing interest 
rates today? And, secondly, the ECB has repeated over and over again over the past 
month the need for strong vigilance. And you said today that it is of the essence that 
the outlook for price stability is maintained. Are you nevertheless concerned that 
inflation expectations, both measured by inflation-linked bonds and also measured by 
surveys of households and consumers, are nevertheless still rising?  
Trichet: First we did not repeat again and again. In Athens we said “strong 
vigilance”, and I repeat “strong vigilance”. But before Athens we did not use this 
adjective. Second, we considered the pros and cons of increasing rates or leaving rates 
unchanged. And we concluded that the present level was still appropriate. Third, we 
are monitoring expectations very closely. And, as I said on behalf of the Governing 
Council, the solid anchoring of inflation expectations is of the essence not only to fulfil 
our primary mandate to which we are inflexibly faithful, because it is the Treaty 
requirement, but also to continue benefiting from favourable market interest rates, 
particularly medium, long-term and very long-term, which incorporate this solid 
anchoring of inflation expectations. From that standpoint we are looking at all 
possible information, particularly the break-even inflation. And we could observe 
during the last months a certain tendency to go up. We are looking at this element 
very carefully. 
2 February 2006 Question: Mr Trichet, you said today that risks to inflation are on the upside and that 
growth appears to be strengthening in line with your scenario, and you have used the 
word “vigilance” three times by my count. Why did the Governing Council not decide 
to raise interest rates today?  
And my second question is: Markets are expecting another rate increase in the first 
quarter and yet another one – at least one more, anyway – by the end of the year. 
Would you repeat again this month, as you did last month, that markets have taken 
your message well?  
Trichet: First, I have mentioned the word “vigilance” three times and I am happy 
that you have noticed that. Second, as regards the market expectations for future 
action in a short period of time – what I am observing seems to be reasonable. 
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4 May 2006 Question: The markets’ expectations of a rate hike of 25 basis points in June: Is this in 
line with the feelings of the Governing Council today? …  
Trichet: Answering to your first question, I stick to what I have already said. Vigilance 
is of the essence. I have already used that word several times, and I have already 
said that, contrary to what some would think, there is no rule to exclude a decision 
when we are not in Frankfurt.  
 
 
31 August 2006 
 
Question: The phrase “ongoing withdrawal of monetary accommodation” seems to 
indicate that we are talking about more than one rate move, but maybe, that is a 
misinterpretation on my part. The markets, which often get it wrong, have priced in at 
least another two. Would they be far wrong?  
Trichet: I will not comment more on that as it seems to me that we are clear enough. 
I have underlined the phrase “progressive withdrawal of monetary accommodation”, 
and what has happened in the past seems to provide all the appropriate keys to 
understanding how we act. As I have said several times, we are in a posture of 
strong vigilance today  
NOTE: Emphasis added. 
 
 
 
Table 16. – Pros and cons of publishing optimal instrument-rate plans 
 
Pros Cons 
• Markets need to form a precise view on the 
probabilities of different paths of future interest 
rates in order to price a wide range of financial 
instruments correctly 
• By making explicit interest-rate assumptions 
underlying published projections of inflation 
and other target variables it is possible to 
bypass the  risk of being inconsistent when 
central banks use either unchanged interest 
rates or market expectations of future central 
bank actions 
• Where forecasts are presented as conditional on 
current information, central bank credibility is 
not lost. It is rather enhanced if a detailed 
explanation of which new piece of information 
has led to a change of view is provided 
 
• Imperfect forecasts may be over-
interpreted by the markets (Morris and 
Shin, 2002) 
• Members of a monetary policy committee 
would find it very difficult to agree on a 
future path of interest rates 
• Central banks would lose credibility when 
their interest forecasts were proved 
inaccurate 
 
 
NOTE: The construction of this Table is based on our reading of Giavazzi (2006a, b), Goodhart (2006, 
2005), and Svensson (2006). 
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Table 17. – Futures price response over longer horizons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: We compute futures price changes as the difference between the one-hour average  futures rate 
(between 16 and 17, London time) on trading day t after the press conference and the 30-minute average 
futures rate (between 1300 and 1330, London time) taken on Governing Council meeting days, that is 
immediately before the press conference takes place. A statement is defined hawkish when the news 
surprise, the difference between Indext2 and Et1 [Indext2] as given by Equation (1), is higher than the 
median of the positive news shocks observed in our sample period (i.e. 0.184). A statement is defined 
dovish when the news surprise is lower than the median negative news shock observed in our sample 
period (i.e. -0.367). In the remaining cases, the central bank statement is classified as neutral. One and two 
stars denote significance at the five and one percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Days Hawkish Dovish
0 -0.015* 0.023**
1 -0.028* 0.027*
2 -0.034* 0.020
3 -0.033 0.027
4 -0.041 0.027
5 -0.047 0.037
6 -0.062* 0.046
7 -0.065* 0.051
8 -0.075* 0.048
9 -0.084* 0.039
10 -0.089* 0.039
11 -0.094* 0.039
12 -0.117** 0.021
13 -0.120* 0.020
14 -0.128** 0.023
15 -0.123* 0.021
16 -0.135** 0.023
17 -0.127* 0.013
18 -0.140* 0.017
19 -0.149** 0.025
20 -0.148* 0.051
21 -0.154* 0.042
22 -0.162** 0.039
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Appendix – Coding of ECB President press conferences 
 
Table A1.  – ECB President announcements about future monetary policy moves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: January 2000 - June 2006. We report the overall monetary policy stance communicated by the ECB 
Governing Council, Index. Note that we have considered only the first press conference of each month. 
We were not able to codify the press conference of 08/06/2000 because the wording of the ECB President 
referred to the past and was not forward-looking. 
NA indicates that the press conference did not take place. 
Date Index Date Index Date Index
05/01/2000 2 09/01/2003 -1 12/01/2006 2
03/02/2000 2 06/02/2003 -2 02/02/2006 2
02/03/2000 2 06/03/2003 -1 02/03/2006 2
13/04/2000 2 03/04/2003 0 06/04/2006 2
11/05/2000 2 08/05/2003 -1 04/05/2006 2
6/8/2000 05/06/2003 -1 08/06/2006 2
06/07/2000 2 10/07/2003 -1
NA NA
14/09/2000 2 04/09/2003 0
05/10/2000 2 02/10/2003 0
02/11/2000 2 06/11/2003 0
14/12/2000 2 04/12/2003 0
NA 08/01/2004 0
01/02/2001 1 05/02/2004 0
01/03/2001 1 04/03/2004 0
11/04/2001 1 01/04/2004 0
10/05/2001 0 06/05/2004 0
07/06/2001 0 03/06/2004 1
05/07/2001 0 01/07/2004 1
NA NA
30/08/2001 -1 02/09/2004 1
11/10/2001 -2 07/10/2004 1
08/11/2001 0 04/11/2004 1
06/12/2001 0 02/12/2004 1
03/01/2002 0 13/01/2005 1
07/02/2002 0 03/02/2005 1
07/03/2002 0 03/03/2005 1
04/04/2002 0 07/04/2005 1
02/05/2002 0 04/05/2005 1
06/06/2002 1 02/06/2005 1
04/07/2002 0 07/07/2005 1
NA NA
12/09/2002 -2 01/09/2005 1
10/10/2002 -1 06/10/2005 2
07/11/2002 -2 03/11/2005 2
05/12/2002 -2 01/12/2005 1
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Examples of Introductory statements and their coding  
 
It should be noted that the excerpts reported in this Appendix only provide some references to the 
classification but do not completely exhaust the information we use to pin down the ECB future 
policy inclination (see Rosa and Verga, 2006 for further details). Emphasis has been added. 
 
Date: 2 March 2000 
The Governing Council also concluded that the balance of risks to price stability in the medium term 
remains on the upside. These upside risks will need to be monitored and assessed continuously in 
order to ensure that timely action can be taken, if and when required. (…) 
The Governing Council concluded that vigilance is required and pointed to several factors. 
Coding: +2 
 
Date: 14 September 2000 
The annual rate of increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) was 2.4% in July 2000. 
Recent consumer price developments in the euro area have been very much influenced by the strong rise in 
oil prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate of the euro.  
While monetary policy cannot address short-term developments in prices, it is imperative for monetary 
policy that medium-term upward pressure on prices be contained. The risk that the current pressure on 
the HICP might spill over onto costs and prices determined in the domestic economy must be taken 
seriously. This holds true in particular in the context of the favourable prospects for economic growth.  
Coding: +2 
 
Date: 6 June 2002 
The Governing Council undertook a comprehensive examination of monetary, financial and economic 
developments and considered the evidence that has become available since its last meeting on 2 May 2002. 
Notwithstanding the recent decline in inflation, the outlook for price stability in the medium term remains 
less satisfactory than expected a few months ago. However, the economic outlook is still subject to 
uncertainty. Further evidence is needed before we can fully assess the upward risks to price stability 
over the medium term. Against this background, the Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB 
interest rates unchanged. 
At this juncture it is therefore particularly important for monetary policy to remain vigilant with 
regard to the further evolution of the key factors determining the outlook for prices.  
Coding: +1 
 
Date: 1 February 2001 
The decision to keep interest rates unchanged reflects the Governing Council's assessment that the risks to 
price stability in the medium term now appear more balanced than at the end of last year. Factors 
which might pose upward risks to price stability in the medium term are still present and as such will 
be subject to ongoing close monitoring. 
(…) The assessment that the risks to price stability are now more balanced, there are still factors 
posing upside risks which therefore require continued attention.  
Coding: +1 
 
Date: 7 March 2002 
As usual, at today's meeting we examined recent monetary, financial and economic developments. The 
Governing Council concluded that the information which had become available in recent weeks confirmed 
that the current level of key ECB interest rates remains appropriate for the maintenance of price stability 
over the medium term. Against this background, the Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB 
interest rates unchanged. 
Coding: 0 
 
Date: 4 March 2004 
Overall, the Governing Council confirmed its previous assessment of a favourable outlook for price 
stability in the euro area over the medium term. Against this background, we concluded that the current 
stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. The key ECB interest rates have therefore been left 
unchanged at their low levels. Our monetary policy stance provides support to the economic recovery in 
the euro area. (…) 
To sum up, the economic analysis continues to indicate that the main scenario for price developments in 
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the coming years is in line with price stability. Cross-checking with the monetary analysis does not alter 
this picture for the time being. 
Coding: 0 
 
Date: 19 July 2003 
Following our regular economic and monetary analysis, we have concluded that the current monetary 
policy stance is appropriate in view of the favourable outlook for price stability over the medium term. 
Accordingly, we have decided to leave the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Interest rates in the euro area 
are low by historical standards, both in nominal and real terms, thus lending support to economic activity 
and helping to safeguard against downside risks to economic growth. The Governing Council will continue 
to monitor carefully all factors that might affect this assessment. 
In the context of our economic analysis, the latest data and information continue to suggest that economic 
growth in the euro area remained subdued in the second quarter of the year, after virtually stagnating in 
the first quarter. The indicators available broadly point to a stabilisation of activity but there are no signs as 
yet of an underlying strengthening in production and confidence. At the same time, financial market 
developments seem to reflect a somewhat more optimistic assessment of the economic outlook both inside 
and outside the euro area. On the whole, we continue to expect a gradual strengthening of economic 
activity in the euro area. This should be supported by lower inflation and thus higher real disposable 
income, the low level of interest rates, and a recovery in external demand for euro area goods and services. 
This assessment is in line with all available forecasts and projections.  
Nevertheless, downside risks to this main scenario are still relevant. While concerns over the SARS 
virus have faded, there are risks relating in particular to the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances 
outside the euro area and to the extent of the adjustment still needed in the euro area corporate sector to 
enhance productivity and profitability. (…) 
To sum up, our economic analysis confirms the expectation that price dynamics will remain moderate in 
the euro area in the context of a gradual economic recovery and the strengthened euro exchange rate. The 
monetary analysis indicates that the strong expansion of M3 should, for the time being, not be seen as 
adversely affecting this outlook. Hence, cross-checking the information from the two pillars leads to the 
conclusion that the outlook for price stability over the medium term remains favourable. 
Coding: -1 
 
Date: 30 August 2001 
Following its regular examination of monetary and economic developments and analysis of their 
implications for the maintenance of price stability in the euro area, the Governing Council decided to lower 
the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. The Governing Council considers that the available evidence 
points to an improvement in the outlook for price developments. This is particularly apparent from the 
information under the second pillar of the ECB's monetary policy strategy, while that related to the first 
pillar remains consistent with a favourable outlook for price stability in the medium term. (…) 
Regarding the second pillar, there are clear signals of lower inflationary pressures from the demand side. 
Recent data on economic activity indicate that real GDP growth in 2001 will most likely be lower than 
was expected a few months ago. This is due in part to external demand, which has remained weak and 
below expectations, owing to slow growth in economic activity in the United States and persistent 
economic weakness in Japan, which have spilled over to other regions of the world. In addition, 
consumption growth in the euro area has been dampened by losses in real disposable income related to past 
increases in consumer prices. All these factors also had a negative impact on investment. (…) 
Overall, as several indicators are pointing to an abatement of inflationary pressures, the new level of 
interest rates is compatible with the maintenance of price stability over the medium term, which, in turn, 
is essential to create a favourable environment for sustainable economic growth. 
Coding: -1 
 
Date: 7 November 2002 
We have reviewed monetary, financial and economic developments and updated our assessment in the light 
of the information available. In view of the high uncertainty on future growth, and its implication for 
medium-term inflationary developments, the Governing Council has discussed extensively the arguments 
for and against a cut in the key ECB interest rates. The view has prevailed to keep interest rates 
unchanged. However, the Governing Council will monitor closely the downside risks to economic 
growth in the euro area. 
Coding: -2 
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Date: 11 October 2001 
As usual, the Governing Council conducted its examination of monetary and economic developments and 
analysis of their implications for the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. Based on its assessment 
under both the first and second pillar, the Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates 
unchanged. The level of the key ECB interest rates at the current juncture is therefore seen as consistent 
with maintaining price stability over the medium term. Given the high level of uncertainty in the 
international environment, we will continue to monitor [downward] developments very closely and 
thoroughly, and we will assess new information in the context of our medium-term-oriented monetary 
policy strategy aimed at delivering price stability in the euro area. 
With regard to economic growth in the euro area ... we will continue to monitor downside risks to the 
current situation. 
Coding: -2 
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